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Rachel Stopchinski* 
ABSTRACT 
In 2017, the prevailing political party in Poland, Law and Justice 
(Prawo i Sprawiedliwos6), proposed a series of radical legislative 
changes designed to strip the Polish judiciary of its independence. 
Though the European Union (EU) has extensively investigated this 
egregious attack on the rule of law, no concrete steps have been taken to 
impose sanctums on, or otherwise discipline, the Polish government for 
defying EU ideals. Despite the fundamental importance of judicial 
independence in maintaining the rule of law, there are presently no 
widely adopted international standards of judicial independence. 
Therefore, no guidelines are promulgated for governments to follow, and 
no well-executed path of action exits to shepherd wayward countries back 
into compliance. Something must be done. This paper seeks to explore the 
history behind the current judicial crisis in Poland, the possibility of 
implementing concrete international standards of judicial independence, 
and the feasibility of enforcement mechanisms driven by private actors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
While judicial independence1 is fundamental to effective, 
democratic governance,2 it is not always guaranteed within countries' 
constitutional framework. 3 Thus, there have been several movements to 
formulate and adopt international standards for judicial independence, 
such as the ABA's Rule of Law Initiative (ROLI)4 and the Central 
Eastern European Law Initiative (CEELI).5 These movements, though 
effective in communicating the importance of protecting judicial 
independence internationally, 6 have not led to a formally adhered to or 
enforced set of standards for judicial independence. 
1. Judicial independence, fur the purposes of this paper, will be defined as 
independence of the judiciary from undue influence from political actors and other 
branches of government. Essential to this concept is the judiciary's ability to make 
reasoned judgments based on their interpretation of the law, rather than based on the 
ideology of the dominant political party. See generally Lydia Brashear Tiede, Judicial 
Independence: Often Cited, Rarely Understood, 15 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 129 (2006) 
(exploring the definition of "judicial independence" and emphasizing the importance of 
"the judiciary's independence from the executive" and the facilitation of "judicial 
discretion" as an "explicit part of the judicial decision -making process"). 
2. See Shimon Shetreet, The Normative Cycle of Shaping Judicial Independence in
Domestic and Internatwnal Law: The Mutual Impact of National and International 
Jurisprudence and Contemporary Practical and Conceptual Challenges, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 
275, 277 (2009) ("Principles of independence in the judiciary are essential for ensuring the 
rule of law, protecting human rights, and securing the continued preservation and 
development of democratic societies."). 
3. See Markus B. Zimmer, Judicial Independence in Central and East Europe: The
Institutional Context, 14 TULSA J. CoMP. & lNT'L L. 53, 58-59 (2006) (discussing the 
multifaceted elements both in and beyond constitutional language needed to ensure 
judicial independence). 
4. See What We Do, Governance and Justice System Strengthening, AMERICAN BAR 
AssOCIATION, https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/rule_of_law/what-we-do/governance­
justice-system-strengthening.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (describing how the ABA 
ROLi promotes independence in judicial systems through its judicial reform programs). 
5. See CEELI INSTITUTE, JUDICIAL MANuAL ON INDEPENDENCE, IMPARTIALITY AND 
INTEGRITY OF JUSTICE 5 (2018) http://ceeliinstitute.org/judicial-manual/ (describing 
CEELI's efforts to assemble "all relevant international standards which establish and 
clarify the principle of judicial independence in the administration of justice"); see 
generally Jacques DeLisle, Lex Americana?: United States Legal Assistance, American 
Legal Models, and Legal Change in the Post-Communist World and Beyond, 10 U. PA. J. 
lNT'L. ECON. L. 179, 188 (1999) (placing the judicial reform efforts of CEELI in the broader 
context of American international legal initiatives and describing its initiatives in detail). 
6. See James R. Sikenat, The American Bar Association and the Rule of Law, 67 SMU 
L. REV. 745 (2014) (depicting the success of ABA efforts to promote American ideals of the 
rule of law internationally, especially through CEELI and related efforts); see generally 
DeLisle, supra note 5 (providing a favorable depiction of CEELI initiatives). 
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This lack of enforced standards plays a role in government and 
economic instability. 7 Threats to judicial independence, perhaps by
political parties attempting to seize control over the rule of law (as will 
be discussed later), lead to broader economic instability.8 International 
private parties, such as corporations, rely on stable governments to 
adjudicate their disputes.9 So, when judicial independence in a 
particular country is threatened, the economic health and development 
suffers as private actors are not apt to invest their business in countries 
where legislation and court judgments are either unpredictable or 
increasingly issued against them. 10 
The detrimental effects can be seen in countries such as Poland. In 
2017, the Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc, or PiS) party, the 
dominant party in Poland, proposed a series of legislative changes 
designed to strip the judiciary of its independence, limit judicial 
discretion, and place more control over the rule of law in the hands of 
the executive and legislative branches.11 A number of these proposals 
were signed into law by the Polish parliament, while the president 
vetoed others largely because of mass protest by Polish citizens. 12 Th� 
passed legislation sets the terms of sitting district court judges to a fixed 
length of four years; the Minister of Justice is afforded the power to 
appoint and dismiss judges without sufficient review from the National 
Council of the Judiciary (NCJ), "the constitutional body responsible for 
safeguarding the independence of the court and judges in Poland." 13 
7. See generally Emma Phillips, The War on Civil Law? The Common Law as a Proxy
for the Global Ambition of Law and Economics, 24 WIS. INT'L L.J. 915, 929 (2007) 
(explaining that in democratic society, "independent and impartial judiciaries contribute 
to the equitable and stable balance of power within the government" and vitally important 
to growth of developing countries); Daniel M. Klerman, Legal Infrastructure, Judicial 
Independence, and Economic Development, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GWBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 
427, 433-34 (2007) (describing the correlation between judicial independence and 
increases in stock prices and equity value). 
8. Phillips, supra note 7, at 929 ("[Independent and impartial judiciaries] resolve
commercial disputes in a predictable and transparent fashion that encourages fair 
competition and economic growth."). 
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See Michal Bilewicz, Poland's Ruling Party Tried a Judicial Power Grab-and
Then Saw It Backfire. Here's Why., THE W ASIDNGTON POST (July 31, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/201 7 /07 /31/polands-ruling-party­
tried-a-judicial-power-grab-and-then-saw-it-backfire-heres­
why/?utm_term=.e2e00db0125d (detailing recent judicial reform measures under the PiS 
political party). 
12. Id.
13. See Poland: Independence of the Judiciary and the Right to Fair Trial at Risk,
AMNESTY INT'L (Aug. 10, 2017, 2:41 PM), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latestJnews/2017/08/ 
poland-independence-of-the-judiciary-and-the-right-to-fair-trial-a t-risk/ (discussing "the 
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These proposals threaten Polish judicial independence in several 
ways. The new judicial appointment structure wears away at the 
separation of powers in Poland by placing most decision-making about 
judicial ideology on an official that is highly susceptible to political 
influence.14 Judges are forced to consider the political ideology of the 
Minister of Justice when making their judgements out of fear of 
dismissal. 15 Therefore, the politically influenced Minister of Justice is 
afforded nearly unabated control over the shaping of the Polish rule of 
law.16
Time will tell what consequences the threats to Polish judicial 
independence will have on the health of the Polish government and 
economy. Governing bodies such as the European Union (EU), however, 
have begun to threaten to invoke its Article 7 sanctions proceedings 
(restricting Poland's EU voting rights) if Poland does not change its 
course for fear of its effects on the larger European community. 17 Other 
more informal enforcement mechanisms that private actors enact may 
prove more effective than these sanctions, particularly those that 
involve economic incentives or punishment. 18 Thus, private actors, 
rather than governmental bodies, could be more apt to instigate the 
enforcement of standards of judicial independence. 19 
Using Poland as a case study, this paper seeks to explore effective 
means of preventing threats to judicial independence and remedying 
deviations from acceptable standards of judicial independence. Further, 
the paper will investigate the utilization of private actors' actions as 
regulators of judicial independence in contrast with sanctions and other 
range of measures the Polish government is taking or attempting to take to 'reform' the 
judiciary in Poland" and the impact on the functions of Polish government). Although this 
is not to say that the NCJ forfeits all right to veto under the new, passed legislation. The 
NCJ retains the right to veto dismissal of judges, but the standards are heightened to a 
two-thirds majority vote. Thus, the veto power remains, but the ability of the NCJ to veto 
is significantly hindered, leaving most of the power in the hands of the Minister of Justice, 
as the NCJ must reach a firm consensus to invoke their right to disagree with the 




17. See Heather Grabbe & Stefan Lehne, Defending EU Values in Poland and
Hungary, CARNEGIE EUROPE (Sept. 4, 2017), http://carnegieeurope.eu/2017/09/04/ 
defending-eu-values-in-poland-and-hungary-pub-72988 (detailing action being taken by 
the EU to curb Polish judicial reform). 
18. See Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing International Law, 97 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1589 
(2011) (detailing the ways that private actors utilize economic "retaliation, reward, 
reputational adjustment, and norm internalization" to enforce compliance with 
international law in conjunction with formal sanctions from state actors). 
19. See id. at 1574.
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methods employed by governmental bodies, such as the European 
Union. Part I will place the conflict in Poland within a historical context 
of economic-driven judicial reform and international promulgation of 
judicial independence. Part II will investigate and determine the 
efficacy of actions taken by government and private actors to influence 
the stability of the rule of law and protection of judicial independence in 
the European Union. Lastly, Part III will propose a framework for an 
enforcement mechanism for judicial independence standards involving 
the cooperation of both intergovernmental and private actors. 
I. POI.JSR JUDICIAL REFORM, THE POST-SOVIET ERA ECONOMIC
TRANSITION, AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE 
Protections for judicial independence were absent when Poland was 
under the domain of the Soviet Union.20 Poland emerged in its 
independence from the Soviet Union "devoid of any normative and 
institutional foundation of an independent judiciary."21 Since then, 
there has been significant judicial reform, partly driven by its transition 
to a market-based economy.22 Despite several judicial reform initiatives 
in central Europe, there are still concerns about threats to judicial 
independence in Poland.23 Thus, there is reason to believe that the 
adoption of more concrete international standards of judicial 
independence would increase adherence to EU law and policy by 
member states. 
For many reasons, judicial independence was not feasible within the 
socialist-style governance present in Soviet-era Poland. Primarily, there 
was an absence of separation of powers, a weak judicial structure, and 
an overly powerful and politicized legislative branch that held total 
responsibility for maintaining constitutionalism. 24 There was no judicial 
review process, which neither afforded the judiciary any method of 
assessing the actions of the executive and legislative branches nor the 
independence or discretion to adjudicate disputes without undue 
20. See Daniel Ryan Koslosky, Toward an Interpretive Model of Judicial Independence:
A Case Study of Eastern Europe, 31 PA. J. INT'L. L. 203, 209 (2009). 
21. Id.
22. Id. at 215.
23. See OPEN Soc'Y INST., Judicial Independence in Poland, in MONITORING THE EU
ACCESSION PROCESS: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 306, 310 (2001) (discussing ongoing 
concerns about judicial independence in Poland). 
24. See Koslosky, supra note 20, at 210-11; see also Ewa Letowska, Courts and
Tribunals Under the Constitution of Poland, 1997 ST. Loms-W ARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 
69, 69 -70 (1997) (giving a historical perspective of the Polish Constitution and noting the 
lack of judicial review of constitutional decision under the 1952 communist constitution). 
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political influence.25 Judges were afforded little autonomy and "were 
required to strictly adhere to standard interpretations of the law[;]" all 
judicial opinions were vetted by the reigning political party before being 
rendered. 26 
Under this system where the government rendered the judiciary 
powerless, judicial independence was an impossibility.27 The judicial 
branch was stripped of its legitimacy and served no purpose aside from 
issuing court judgments in the Communist Party's interests. 28 All of the 
hallmarks of a modern, properly functioning judiciary simply were not 
present, and thus, countries like post-Soviet Poland entered democratic 
governance without the means to properly ensure judicial 
independence.29 Thus, drastic reforms to the judiciary were needed in 
the post-Soviet government transition. 
Judicial reform in this era can be partly explained by the economic 
transition from socialist property law to a market-based system of 
private property.30 Private property ownership created a variety of 
concerns that could be best regulated through a stronger judiciary since 
"the inadequate protection of property rights leads to lower investment 
rates and slower economic growth."31 So while the legislature could 
enact laws to minimize economic disputes, ultimately the judiciary 
became necessary to ensure the enforcement of enacted legislation 
without fear that their decisions would bring about negative 
consequences.32 Further, when passed legislation is vague, the 
judiciary's role in private property regimes is to ensure the rights of 
property owners are respected.33 An effective market-based economy, 
therefore, often relies on a healthy balance between the legislature's 
actions and regulation mechanisms by the judiciary who interprets, 
25. Koslosky, supra note 20, at 211 ("Judicial independence of course presupposes the 
presence of judicial review. The independence and objectivity of a judge as an adjudicator 
of disputes is meaningless if he does not have the power to review [the constitutionality of 
executive and legislative action]."). 
26. Id. at 211. 
27. Id. at 212.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 215.
31. Id.
32. See Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, Economic Growth and Judici,al Independence:
Cross-County Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators, 19 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 497, 499 
(2003) (discussing the way that judicial independence allows the judiciary to adjudicate 
disputes between various parties without facing negative consequences). 
33. See id. at 497-98 (depicting the way that market economies and rational politicians 
need judicial independence because it ensures that legislation regarding property rights is 
actually honored). 
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shapes, and enforces the law. 34 
In theory, Poland made great strides to reform its judiciary, but 
until a new constitution was passed in 1997, Poland continued to 
function under its 1952 Communist Constitution, which left the 
judiciary's role limited.35 The 1997 Constitution opened a new era of 
judicial reform and activity, but Poland still struggles to maintain 
judicial independence today. In a 2001 report regarding the EU 
accession process and the state of judicial independence in newly 
acquiesced member states, Poland was described as having "made 
considerable progress" but still having "significant areas of concern."36 
Among these were concerns that the Minister of Justice, a member of 
the executive branch, retained "considerable administrative and 
supervisory authority over the organization and affairs of the 
judiciary."37 Further, the report cited concerns over the executive's 
control of the judicial budget, the amount compensation for judges, and 
judicial tenure. 38 These ongoing concerns are at odds with EU law and 
recommendations for judicial independence. 
The European Union has codified standards of judicial 
independence in a few different conventions and charters, but the 
majority are framed in terms of the universal human right to due 
process and a fair trial.39 Primarily, existing EU law on this topic is 
found in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
34. See generally id. (providing a survey of experts in seventy-one countries showing
that judicial independence positively impacts the GDP growth per capita in a sample of 
fifty-seven countries); Katharina Pistor, Martin Raiser & Stanislaw Gelfer, Law and 
Finance in Transition Economies, 8 ECON. TRANSITION 325 (2000) (noting the importance 
of judicial reform in transition economies and through data analysis arriving at the 
conclusion that reform centered on "legal effectiveness" has the greatest impact on the 
health of the economy); Shimon Shetreet, Judicial Independence, Liberty, Democracy and 
International Economy, in THE CULTURE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: RULE OF LAW AND 
WORLD PEACE 14, 14 (Shimon Shetreet ed., 2004) ("It is generally accepted that judicial 
independence is a central foundation for democracy, liberty, and orderly economy."); 
Emma Phillips, supra note 7, at 929 ("[R]obust judiciary is essential to ensure that rules 
are applied fairly and impartially and that they develop appropriately over time."). 
35. See Ewa Letowska, Courts and Tribunals Under the Constitution of Poland, 1997
ST.Lours-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 69, 69 (1997). 
36. OPEN Soc'y INST., Judicial Independence in Poland, in MONITORING THE EU 
ACCESSION PROCESS: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 306, 310 (2001). 
37. Id. at 313.
38. Id. at 310-11.
39. See Shimon Shetreet, General Introduction, in THE CULTURE OF JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE: RULE OF LAW AND WORLD PEACE 6 (Shimon Shetreet ed., 2004) 
("International law influences domestic law by virtue of international human rights 
treaties, which provide for principles of fair procedures and for the right to be tried before 
an impartial and independent tribunal."). 
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and Fundamental Freedoms40 and the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union.41 The premise of the EU promulgation of 
judicial independence and the rule of law is to "constrai[n] the State" 
where the state does not constrain itself and pay "straightforward 
attention to public officials."42 The flaw in these codified standards is 
that though they outline the ideology the European Union hopes to 
protect, they do not outline actionable ways in which member states can 
ensure that judicial independence is maintained. 43 For a country like 
Poland, the vagueness of the law mandating an independent judiciary 
may allow for non-compliance while a more specific set of judicial 
independence standards might not. 44 
Scholars have outlined some of the essential elements of judicial 
independence as: "(1) fixed tenure that offers protection from arbitrary 
removal and that is subject only to narrowly tailored provisions allowing 
discipline or removal of judges for misconduct or incapacity; (2) fixed 
and adequate compensation; (3) minimum qualifications; and (4) limited 
civil immunity for judicial decisions."45 Using these essential elements, 
several international NGO's have sought to create more concrete 
frameworks for organizing judicial branches and separation of powers to 
facilitate higher levels of judicial independence. 
One of the foremost organizations is the International Association of 
Judicial Independence and World Peace which, in 2008, drafted the 
40. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, as amended by Protocol No. 14, art. 6, June 1, 2010, CETS no.194. 
41. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 47, 2000 O.J. (C 364)
20. 
42. DANIELA PIANA, European Standards of Judicial Governance, in JUDICIAL
ACCOUNTABILITIES IN NEW EUROPE: FROM RULE OF LAW TO QUALITY OF JUSTICE 49, 51 
(Ralf Rogowski ed., 2010). 
43. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, supra note 40, at 9 ("(E]veryone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law."); see also 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 41, at 20 ("Everyone is 
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal previously established by law."). 
44. &e Dimitry Kochenov & Laurent Pech, Uplwlding the Rule of Law in the EU: On 
the Commission's 'Pre-Article 7 Procedure' as a Timid Step in the Right Direction 4 
(European University Institute Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Global 
Governance Programme, EUI Working Paper RSCAS No. 24, 2015), 
http://cadmus.euieu/bitstream/handle/l814/35437/RSCAS_20l5_24.pdf?sequence=3 
(discussing the difficulty in enforcing provisions in the Treaty on European union which 
express "open-ended" values). 
45. Thomas E. Plank, The Essential Elements of Judicial Independence and the 
Experience of Pre-Soviet Russia, 5 WM. & MA.RY BILL RTS. J. 1, 5 (1996). 
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Mount Scopus International Standards of Judicial Independence.46 
These standards were drafted to acknowledge the judiciary's role in the 
"protection of human rights and in the operation of an efficient and fair 
market economy with a human face in the era of globalization."47 This 
thirty-seven-page document comprehensively depicts the building and 
maintaining of a culture of judicial independence both nationally and 
internationally.48 In these standards, the culture of judicial 
independence is reliant on five factors: (1) "creating institutional 
structure;" (2) "establishing constitutional infrastructures;" (3) 
"introducing legislative provisions and constitutional safeguards;" (4) 
"creating adjudicative arrangements and jurisprudence;" and (5) 
"maintaining ethical traditions and code of judicial conduct."49 Under 
this methodology, the standards outline concrete ways in which to 
guarantee judicial independence, such as vesting the removal of a judge 
in a judicial tribunal rather than in the executive50 and ensuring that 
adequacy of judicial salaries and pensions are adequate and fixed by 
law.51 
The Mount Scopus International Standards of Judicial 
Independence are highly valued and have been incorporated into other 
NGO's efforts to promulgate standards of judicial independence, such as 
the CEELI. CEELI is a part of the American Bar Association's (ABA) 
broader ROLi and focuses on "protect[ing] fundamental rights and 
individual liberties [and] promot[ing] transparent incorruptible, 
accountable governments[.]"52 CEELI's Judicial Manual on 
Independence, Impartiality, and Integrity of Justice, published in 
August 2017, provides a thematic compilation referencing over one 
hundred different international standards and is designed to act as "an 
easy-to-use reference tool to facilitate day-to-day work of judges[.]"53, 
This manual adopts many of the Mount Scopus International Standards 
of Judicial Independence's principles as to creating a culture of judicial 
46. See generally INT'L Ass'N OF JUDICIAL INDEP. AND WORLD PEACE, MOUNT SCOPUS
STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 1 (2008), https://www.jiwp.org/mt-scopus­
standards-2007-curre#!mt-scopus-standards/c 14de. 
47. Id. at 2. See also Shetreet, supra note 2, at 276 ("The development of the Mt.
Scopus Standards was necessitated by the absence of a modern, thorough revision of 
standards for both national and international judges."). 
48. INT'L Ass'N OF JUDICIAL INDEP. AND WORLD PEACE, supra note 46, at 3.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 4.
51. Id. at 6.
52. Mission of the CEELI Institute, CEELI INSTITUTE, http://ceeliinstitute.org/who-we­
are/mission/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2019). 
53. CEELI INSTITUTE, supra note 5, at 5 (2017), http://ceeliinstitute.org/wp­
contentluploads/2015/07 /NewCover ManualJustice_AUG_l 7. pdf. 
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independence. 54 
Standards for judicial independence provide governments with 
actionable ways to protect judicial independence. Rather than asserting 
vague ideology-such as the need to protect the right to a fair trial-the 
Mount Scopus and CEELI standards focus on ways that governments 
can better organize themselves. These standards focus on developing 
government structures with a more robust separation of powers by 
outlining the roles the executive, legislature, and the judiciary play in 
maintaining judicial independence. So while the standards may make 
some broad statements, such as "the judiciary as a whole shall be 
independent,"55 these statements are paired with concrete objectives, 
such as "the power to discipline or remove a judge must be vested in an 
institution independent of the Executive"56 or "legislation introducing 
changes to the terms of conditions of judicial services shall not be 
applied to judges holding office at the time of the passing the legislation 
unless the changes improve the terms of service and are generally 
applied."57 By specifically outlining the nature of the relationship
between the branches of government needed to facilitate judicial 
independence, these standards better equip governments with the 
means to effectively promote judicial independence in their own 
organizational structure. 
Thus, standards focused on more actionable objectives make it 
abundantly clear what is and is not permitted. Under these models, 
deviations from standards are more easily identified, and therefore, 
member countries will be more aware what the European Union would 
not find acceptable. From a practicality standpoint, there is a benefit to 
imposing uniformity on countries within an intergovernmental 
organization like the European Union. While these standards lack 
flexibility, 58 if the European Union maintains its commitment to 
advancing the rule of law in central and eastern Europe, adopting more 
concrete standards such as these would assert their viewpoint on 
judicial independence. Assuming that a core aspect of good governance 
is establishing law that provides for predictable outcomes, 59 establishing 
54. Id. at 14.
55. INT'L Ass'N OF JUDICIAL INDEP. AND WORLD PEACE, supra note 46, at 6. 
56. Id. at 8. 
57. Id. at 11. 
58. These standards are less flexible in the sense that adopting them would prescribe 
specific judicial branch organization onto member states, whereas more broad standards 
for judicial independence afford member states more freedom in the structuring of their 
individual governments. 
59. See David Boies, Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law, 22 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL. 57, 57 (2006) (describing how a key aspect of the "rule of law" proves that "the rule 
applied to a particular case must be reasonably predictable"); see generally Phillips, supra 
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more explicit guidelines could encourage countries to remain compliant 
preemptively rather than pushing the boundaries to discover what is 
and is not acceptable. 
II. The Efficacy of Intergovernmental and Private Actors in Enforcing
International Standards of Judicial Independence
As evidenced through the case of Poland, both private, economic 
interests and the needs of intergovernmental organizations like the 
European Union can drive judicial reform. Despite this oversight, due to 
the lack of concrete standards of judicial independence, states may still 
deviate from accepted protections of the independent judiciary. When a 
state launches threats against judicial independence, private actors may 
play a more effective role in encouraging compliance than 
intergovernmental organizations. While the European Union can 
impose sanctions on non-compliant member states, these sanctions may 
not prove as convincing or as timely as direct economic consequences by 
private actors for failure of a country to maintain judicial independence. 
The Role of the European Union 
Membership in the European Union is highly valued by member 
states due to the many benefits conferred from affiliation with a larger 
organization of states.60 The European Union thus has an incentive in 
ensuring that member states comply with its ideals and maintain 
certain standards of democracy and fair governance.61 The European 
note 7, at 928 ("Good governance requires a known set of rules that are enforced, effective 
mechanisms to ensure the legitimate application of these rules, and an independent third 
party to resolve disputes in their application"). 
60. See About the EU: Poland, EUROPEAN UNION, https://europa.eu/european­
union/about-eu/countries/member-countries/poland_en Qast visited Feb. 13, 2019) 
(describing, for example, Poland's involvement in the EU including how, in 2015, total EU 
spending in Poland reached € 13.258); see also Remi Adekoya, How the EU Transformed 
Poland, THE GUARDIAN (May 1, 2014, 11:16 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
commentisfree/2014/may/01/eu-poland-10-years-economic (illustrating the vast economic 
and social benefit Poland has received from its participation in the European Union); see 
generally Phillips, supra note 7, at 927(describing how "much-coveted membership in the 
European Union" drives judicial reform, especially the maintenance of judicial 
independence in Poland). 
61. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union Preamble, Dec. 13,
2007, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 1 (stating that the Union is founded on the "principles of liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law" 
principles which are common to the Member States); id. art. 3 (regarding the EU's 
commitment to advancing its values, the treaty assets that a member state "[i]n its 
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Union has maintained a long-term commitment to the promulgation of 
judicial independence62 and holds expectations of judicial independence 
for its member states. 63 Inherent in judicial independence is the idea 
that the public has access to its fair day in court where court judgments 
are not made on the basis of government and political influence but 
instead on the judge's own interpretation of the law and facts.64 As 
discussed earlier, EU law mandates that member states must maintain 
independent judiciaries; so when judicial independence is threatened, 
this violates both EU ideals and laws, and the European Union must act 
to bring deviating states back into compliance. 
The European Union's primary sanction that it could use against a 
non-compliant state is Article 7, which is intended to be used when EU 
member countries commit human rights violations. 65 Article 7 was first
created through the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam66 (as an amendment to 
the previously adopted Treaty on the European Union),67 where the 
European Union sought to address the possibility of human rights 
violations by countries with histories of corrupt governments and with 
differing ideologies on democracy and the rule of law.68 The European 
Union could send a formal warning to a non-compliant member by 
invoking Article 7(1).69 By invoking Article 7(2), the European Union 
relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and 
interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens"). 
62. PLANA, supra note 42, at 51 ("The EU holds judicial independence and managerial 
accountability to be the two fundamental conditions for obtaining membership."). 
63. See, e.g., Boies, supra note 59, at 58 ("Judicial independence and judicial 
supremacy work together in an attempt to guarantee that the rule of law will not be 
eroded by the political pressures in existence at any particular point in time"); 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union Preamble, Dec. 13, 2007, 2012 O.J. 
(C 326) 1 (The Union is founded on the "principles of liberty, democracy, respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law" principles which are 
common to the Member States) (emphasis added). 
64. See generally Shetreet, supra note 2, at 276 (describing how international human
rights treaties value judicial independence because of its connection to fair court 
procedure). 




67. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties 
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. 
(C 340) 1. 
68. Id. art. 1 (adding the text "The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, 
principles which are common to the Member States" to the amended Treaty on European 
Union). 
69. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 7, Dec. 13, 2007, 2012
O.J. (C 326) 1, 7. 
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could restrict the non-compliant state's voting rights, which limits its 
direct influence on the decision-making of the European Union.70 
Though this possibility exists, Article 7 is a dormant law that has 
never been invoked; thus, the feasibility of utilizing this sanctioning 
method to encourage compliance with judicial independence standards 
is questionable.71 This is because Article 7 is a multi-step process that 
involves thorough review of the offending country's actions with 
conditions for sanctions that are hard to satisfy.72 Further, the 
"relatively open-ended nature" of EU provisions regarding the "rule of 
law" make it difficult for the European Commission to take action 
against non-compliant member states. 73 The European Union's focus on 
threats to the rule of law of a "systemic nature" also creates a situation 
where typically the member state brought up for Article 7 procedures 
has substantially deviated from EU ideals. 74 This focus on retroactively 
punishing member states for straying too far from the EU rule of law 
principles permits member states to deviate to a point where returning 
to compliance is time-consuming and intensive. Therefore, Article 7 
procedures are not terribly effective in preventing threats to judicial 
independence in the first place. 
Article 7 sanctions are not the only ways that the European Union 
could take action against non-compliant member states. For example, 
the European Union could attach conditions to the aid it provides 
countries that do not comply with standards of judicial independence. 
The European Union has a seven-year financial framework that 
provides funding for the advancement of member states. 75 States that do 
not adhere to EU values could receive a lower allocation of funding, 
while states that adhere closely could receive more financial 
assistance.76 This would be akin to economic punishment and could 
encourage member states to closely follow EU law and policy. There are 
some downsides to the European Union, however, if it were to take this 
approach. The EU budget primarily supports "growth and jobs," 
especially in underdeveloped and disadvantaged populations, and 
70. Id.
71. See Kochenov & Pech, supra not.e 44, at 3.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 4.
74. Id. at 7.
75. See Budget, EUROPEAN UNION, https://europa.eu/european-union/topics/budget_en
(last visit.ed, Feb. 13, 2019). 
76. See Overview MFF 2014-2020, EUROPEAN UNION, http://ec.europa.eu/budget/
mff/index2014-2020_en.cfm (last visit.ed Feb. 13, 2019) (explaining how the MFF provides 
a seven-year budget for the EU to advance specified initiatives, but the allocation of the 
funds could vary over the course of the seven-year period due to built-in flexibility 
mechanisms). 
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"producing safe and secure food supplies, innovative farming and 
efficient and sustainable use of land and forests."77 Reducing this 
funding, which is designed to assist the welfare of disadvantaged 
populations, could have a significant impact on human rights, and so 
the European Union may not wish to utilize this type of economic 
sanctioning. 
In Poland's case on July 26, 2017, the European Commission 
launched "an infringement proceeding against Poland for breaches of 
EU law ."78 In its press release, the commission threatened to "trigger 
Article 7(1) procedure" and issued several recommendations for 
revisions to recent reform efforts due to concerns about the "lack of an 
independent and legitimate Constitutional review in Poland."79 Poland 
was given one month to address the European Commission's concerns 
about the commission's desire to "pursue a constructive dialogue with 
the Polish Government."80 The press release made clear that if Poland 
did not make substantial progress towards compliance with EU 
standards of judicial independence, infringement proceedings would 
continue. 81 
Poland, however, did not change its course and instead solidified its 
alliance with Hungary, another country under attack by the European 
Union for its lack of adherence to the rule of law. 82 On September 25, 
2017, the President of Poland, Andrzej Duda, who previously vetoed 
several of the controversial judicial reform bills, called for "further 
'consultations' over potential changes to the constitution."83 Poland 
continued to waver in its commitment to maintaining judicial 
independence; the PiS majority political party disagreed with politicians 
like the president on what should be done in the face of potential EU 
sanctions. As a result, the European Commission again found that 
Poland had not made considerable progress and has since "moved to the 
next stage of the infringement procedure."84 In this stage, the European 
77. See Budget, supra note 75. 
78. European Commission Press Release IP/17/2161, The European Commission Acts 





82. Lili Bayer, Poland and Hungary Stand United (Except on Russia), POLITICO (Sept.
23, 2017, 6:43 PM), http://www.politico.eu/article/poland-hungary-stand-united-except-on­
russia-orban-szydlo/. 
83. Polish President Urges Constitutional Change Amid Plans for Legal Reform, RADIO
POLAND (Sept. 25, 2017, 1:11 PM), http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/327351,Polish­
president-urges-constitutional-change-amid -plans-for-legal -reform. 
84. Hervey & Livingston, supra note 65.
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Commission again issued a notice to Poland urging the state to take 
"appropriate measures" to address their concerns or the Commission 
would refer the case to the Court of Justice of the EU.85 Thereafter, the 
European Commission granted Poland another month to work towards 
correcting infringements on articles on the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU) and the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU).86 
The Polish government still did not comply with EU calls for 
compliance. On December 20, 2017, the European Commission elevated 
the infringement procedures as to the ordinary courts within Poland 
and stated that there was a "clear risk of a serious breach of the rule of 
law."87 On June 27, 2018, the EU General Affairs Council held a hearing
to consider the crisis in Poland. 88 The Polish government gave no 
indication "of forthcoming measures to address the Commission's 
outstanding concerns."89 Furthermore, the crisis in Poland worsened on
June 28, 2018, when the government executed a "sweeping purge of the 
Supreme Court'' and forced retirement of twenty-seven justices, 
including the top judge. 90 The European Commission again invoked
infringement proceedings in line with Article 7(1) but this time 
regarding actions taken against the Supreme Court by issuing a Letter 
of Formal Notice on July 2, 2018.91 The European Commission gave
Poland one month to reply to the formal notice. Unsurprisingly, at a 
follow up hearing with the General Affairs Council, the Polish 
government held steadfast to its position.92 On September 24, 2018, the
commission referred Poland to the EU Court of Justice "due to its 
violation of the principle of judicial independence."93
The infringement proceedings remain ongoing without a foreseeable 
end in sight. Perhaps other enforcement methods of judicial 
independence standards would be more effective either independently or 
in conjunction with action taken by the European Union. 
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. European Commission Press Release IP/17/3186, The Commission, Independence
of the Judiciary: European Commission Takes Second Step in Infringement Procedure 
against Poland (Sept. 12, 2017), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3186_en.htm. 
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Marc Santora, Poland Purges Supreme Court, and Protesters Take to Streets, N.Y.
TIMES (July 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/03/world/europe/poland-supreme­
court-protest.html?module=inline. 
91. European Commission Press Release IP/18/4341, The Commission, Rule of Law:
Commission Launches Infringement Procedure to Protect the Independence of the Polish 
Supreme Court (July 2, 2018), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-434l_en.htm. 
92. Id.
93. Id.
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The Role of Private Actors 
As previously discussed, economic factors play a strong role in 
encouraging judicial reform, and judicial independence plays a strong 
role in maintaining a healthy economy. As such, economic measures can 
effectively persuade governments to comply with international 
standards, especially considering the essential relationship between 
states and private actors such as international corporations. States rely 
on international commerce to bolster their economic health, while 
international businesses rely on state protection of judicial 
independence for their long-term prosperity, which is closely linked to 
the adjudication of their international disputes. 94 Because private actors 
maintain a level of flexibility and freedom in their activities that 
intergovernmental organizations do not possess, they may be best 
positioned to engage in economic measures to enforce international 
standards of judicial independence. 
Economic development does not occur without investments by 
businesses, many of which are international private actors. 95 These 
private actors will not invest unless they have confidence that they will 
turn a profit and that there is a low amount of risk. 96 Thus, factors such 
as judicial independence can play a role in a private actor's decision to 
invest in a country's economy.97 This is because an independent 
judiciary is essential to maintaining private property rights and because 
private actors must rely on the judiciary to adjudicate their legal 
disputes-the outcome of which influences the health of their 
businesses.98 Without judicial independence, private actors cannot be 
sure that "courts do not favor politically powerful or connected parties in 
contractual disputes" or that courts will not "always side with the 
government."99 Thus, private actors have a marked interest in ensuring 
that judicial independence is maintained in regions where they have 
made significant economic investments100 and are unlikely to invest in 
94. See Phillips, supra note 7, at 929 ("(Independent judiciaries] resolve commercial 
disputes in a predictable and transparent fashion that encourages fair competition and 
economic growth"). 
95. Klerman, supra note 7, at 428.
96. See id. (describing how "[i]n most developed countries, constitutional guarantees 
and powerful courts reduce the risk of expropriation," and so this would be an 
environment w here investments would occur). 
97. See generally Feld & Voigt, supra note 32, at 516 (showing a positive link between 
the presence of judicial independence and gains in countries' overall GDP through a study 
of 57 countries). 
98. Id.
99. Klerman, supra note 7, at 428.
100. Id.
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countries where judicial independence is threatened.101 
Recent scholarship has noted the importance of judicial 
independence in a country's economic health, which supports the notion 
that countries must evaluate economic risk when making decisions 
about judicial structure.102 Because private actors invest in countries
where they can rely on judicial independence for the fair adjudication of 
their disputes, countries must maintain judicial independence for the 
betterment of their economy by private actors.103 Where one party fails 
to uphold their side of this relationship, both parties feel the economic 
consequences.104 Private actors thus have an incentive to encourage
states to move toward compliance with international standards of 
judicial independence.105 
Private actors may advocate for judicial reform in a few ways. For 
example, on a basic level, a private actor may cause direct economic 
consequences by simply withdrawing its business from countries that do 
not maintain judicial independence.106 Whereas intergovernmental 
organizations like the European Union must carefully consider the 
impact of withdrawal of funds from member states, private actors 
maintain a higher level of freedom and can make decisions solely based 
on the health of their business. This impact on the promotion of the 
independent judiciary would be felt more significantly if private actors 
banded together and directly communicated a message of disapproval 
against countries that did not uphold standards of judicial 
independence. The counterpoint to this approach would be that 
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., Shetreet, supra note 34, at 14; see also Phillips, supra note 7, at 918
(discussing judicial reform and judicial independence as essential to the development of 
countries such as Poland); Klerman, supra note 7, at 434 (describing judicial independence 
as essential to the economic health of a country). 
103. Klerman, supra note 7, at 428.
104. When judicial independence is absent, private investors are not likely to invest in
the country's economy. Private actors that already have investments may suffer financial 
losses where judiciaries that adjudicate their disputes are not independent and impartial 
because the judiciary may by default hold in favor of the government or the interests of 
the dominant political party. The country, in turn, faces economic backlash when 
investors withdraw due to fears of lost profits and financial insecurity. See Klerman, 
supra note 7, at 428 (depicting the economic theory behind judicial independence's 
encouragement of investment by private actors and how countries must maintain judicial 
independence to avoid economic consequences). 
105. See Phillips, supra note 7, at 920 (explaining the role of private actors in shaping
judicial reform through the expenditure of "loans, grants, and technical expertise, 
international organizations, donors, nongovernmental organizations, and private 
consultants"). 
106. See generally Stephan, supra note 18, at 1584-85 (describing the recent increase of
upstream international lawmaking by private actors who utilize economic means as ways 
to shape the law in favor of effective global business transactions). 
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attacking the economy of a country could eventually have an impact on 
the state of human rights through the loss of jobs and overall decrease 
in profit by the people living there. This impact on human rights, 
however, would perhaps be less extreme than if the European Union 
were to withdraw its funding that directly assists vulnerable 
communities whom are already at risk. 
Private actors concerned about directly cutting ties with non­
compliant countries could instead make investments into organizations, 
such as CEELI, that promote judicial independence in areas without a 
strong tradition of independent judiciaries. These positive investments 
may have a higher correlation in encouraging the protection of judicial 
independence as both send a direct message in support of judicial 
independence and support organizations actively working to promote it. 
There is a strong history of private actors effectively shaping the 
promulgation of the rule of law, especially in central and eastern 
Europe.107 This export of the rule of law to private entities is fairly 
harmless as long as it can be assured that these private actors do not 
inappropriately use these investments for their own gain (such as 
engaging in corruption or conduct such as bribery). 108 If private actors 
contain their financial investments to NGOs that have proven to 
support judicial reform, this could be an effective way of promulgating 
adherence to judicial independence standards. 
In the case of Poland, threats to judicial independence have already 
created concern that Poland would face future economic difficulty. In an 
interview with Bloomberg News in Brussels, Principal Vice President 
Frans Timmermans of the European Commission noted that the "attack 
on judicial independence has given foreign investors jitters about the 
credibility of the Polish legal system." 109 Timmermans asserted that the 
threat to judicial independence was "a business issue" and that 
investors would worry about the "security of [their] investments." 110 
Thus, an opportunity exists for private actors to openly decry the Polish 
government's actions in limiting judicial independence. This open 
107. See, e.g., Phillips, supra not;e 7, at 928 (discussing the promotion of judicial 
independence through Central and East;ern Europe, driven by the funding of privat;e 
actors). 
108. See id. at 932 (describing the pitfalls of privat;e investment in judicial reform as the
judiciary becoming beholden to private entities rather than political parties, but also 
discounting this theory as a shortcoming of the poor planning of the executed judicial 
independence reforms in question). 
109. Jonathan Stearns, Ewa Krukowska & Nikos Chrysoloras, Poland's Authoritarian
Shift Spurs Warning of Economic Trouble, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 17, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201 7 -09-1 7 /poland-s-authoritarian-shiftsspurs­
warning-of-economic-trouble. 
110. Id.
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condemnation of threats to judicial independence, especially when 
coupled with either economic threats or investments in NGOs dedicated 
to the promulgation of judicial independence, could be the influence 
Poland needs to return to compliance. While there are indications that 
pressure from the European Union may slowly convince Poland to 
change its course, immediate threats to the country's economy may 
cause quicker action (whereas action by the European Union could take 
several months due to the need for recommendations and court 
proceedings before the institution of sanctions). 
ill. CREATING A MODEL FOR THE EFFECTIVE PROMOTION OF 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
As discussed, both intergovernmental and private actors recognize 
the importance of judicial independence. Therefore, the best model for 
the effective regulation of international standards of judicial 
independence in Europe would involve the cooperation by the European 
Union and private actors with economic interests in the region. 
This model would involve the promulgation of concrete standards of 
judicial independence much like the Mount Scopus International 
Standards of Judicial Independence that have a larger focus on 
establishing organizational safeguards. These standards could contain 
provisions that state (but are of course not limited to) that the executive 
and legislature should not be allowed power to overturn judicial 
decisions, that compensation for judges should be adequate and fixed, 
and that judicial disciplinary committees must be independent bodies 
not subject to excessive oversight by the other branches of government. 
Importantly, new standards would focus equally on the underlying 
ideals that support the notion of judicial independence (such as the 
right to a fair trial) and on ways that countries can draft constitutions 
and formulate governmental structures that ensure judicial 
independence is protected. 
With more well-defined and stricter international standards of 
judicial independence, it would be more difficult for EU member states 
to deviate from standards in the future. However, in the event of non­
compliance, private actors who are not tied to the administrative 
bureaucracy of international government organizations could act as the 
enforcers of these standards by utilizing economic punishment and 
incentives. When countries deviate from standards of judicial 
independence as outlined by the European Union, private actors can 
band together to withdraw their business from offending countries. 
Private actors can also collectively organize, contribute to organizations 
that promote judicial independence, and publicly comment about their 
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decision to avoid business in countries where judicial independence is 
threatened. This economic and social commentary, in combination with 
official efforts by the European Union, could add needed pressure to 
ensure that countries return to compliance. In this way, judicial 
independence could be better protected by recognizing the interests of 
both intergovernmental and private actors and ensuring the protection 
of both economic and human rights. 
That said, the influence of private actors who are driven by 
economic interests works best when curbed by intergovernmental 
organizations who are more in tune with the needs of human rights 
initiatives. An effective model would avoid leaving too much discretion 
to private actors in the entirety of enforcement decisions as they may be 
persuaded to act with only their best economic interests in mind versus 
the public's need to have their rights secured.111 Primarily, the 
standards need to be drafted and shaped by the European Union, as 
their mission is to represent the needs of all people in Europe, not just 
corporations. With clear, unbiased objectives defined by the European 
Union, private actors would have clear guidelines of what constituted 
acceptable and unacceptable behavior on the part of EU member 
countries. 
A balance must be struck to ensure the proper enforcement of 
standards of judicial independence without bias as to the country's 
economic standing or potential. For example, private actors may take 
into consideration the profitability of the market in question. Applying a 
cost-benefit analysis, a private actor could determine that potential 
unfair treatment in disputes in a country with low judicial 
independence is worth the risk due to the high potential for economic 
gain in the region and the monetary loss it would sustain by 
withdrawing its business. Moreover, it is possible that corruption could 
occur; private actors' economic threats could then make judiciaries too 
sympathetic when adjudicating private actors' disputes due to a 
pressure to retain their business in the country. 
Thus, careful regulation by the European Union must occur to 
ensure that enforcement of standards of judicial independence is done 
fairly and equally among member states. The European Union could 
offer incentives for private actors to enforce judicial independence 
standards by enacting policy-perhaps conferring trade benefits for 
private actors that restrict their business to compliant member states. 
Thus, if the European Union were to adopt more specific and concrete 
111. See Stephan, supra note 18, at 1619-23 (describing how law created for and by
private actors leads to effective lawmaking for those parties, but that, in areas where 
human rights are involved, the cooperation of the state leads to more optimal results for 
all involved). 
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standards of judicial independence, it could incentivize private actors to 
utilize them to identify and openly support countries where judicial 
independence is actively fostered while foregoing business where it is 
weak. 
If a balance can be found, the needs of intergovernmental 
organizations, private actors with economic interests, and the people 
who reside in countries where judicial independence is at threat can all 
be met. With the combined influence of the European Union, who 
provides substantial benefit in terms of social welfare, and private 
actors, who provide support to the economy, non -compliant countries 
can be persuaded to return to compliance. In the absence of both the 
European Union and the investments of private actors, a country like 
Poland would surely suffer. So, by leveraging the influence of both 
parties in a combined effort, Poland may conform to EU values and 
ideals as proscribed by EU law. 
CONCLUSION 
With threats to the independence of Poland's judiciary, there is 
clearly a need for cooperation between the European Union and private 
actors with investments in the region. While the European Union can 
provide the necessary law, values, and structure to mandate that an 
independent judiciary be present in its member states, its enforcement 
proceedings for non-compliance can be lengthy and overly bureaucratic. 
Overall, non-compliant member states may not feel a sense of urgency 
when faced with threats of Article 7 procedures, especially absent a 
history of these sanctions ever being utilized. Private actors, on th� 
other hand, are not tied down by diplomatic concerns and can act in line 
with their economic interests, which are greatly influenced by a lack of 
judicial independence. Private actors can have a significant impact on 
the promotion of judicial independence in a country like Poland by 
utilizing both economic threats and investments in NGOs that 
promulgate judicial independence. The weight of sanctioning by the 
European Union can effectively be combined with direct and more 
immediate economic consequences by private actors. 
Judicial independence is a core value of proper governance and 
ensures that all parties, no matter their social status or political 
identity, receive due process and a fair day in court. Thus, it is in the 
interest of the European Union not only to create or adopt a more well­
defined set of standards to ensure that judicial independence is 
protected internationally but also to encourage enforcement 
mechanisms that effectively encourage non-compliant member states to 
adhere with standards. With the careful oversight of intergovernmental 
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bodies, private actors can effectively advocate for judicial reform that 
both meets their economic interests and the human rights needs of the 
European people. 
